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Mission Impossible? Genuine Economic Development in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council Countries 
DUHA AL-KUWARI 
Abstract 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is considered one of the most important regional 
entities in the world. It provides a framework for stability regarding world oil and gas 
supplies and facilitates great wealth from oil and gas exports. After more than thirty 
years of promises from GCC countries, however, how does oil and gas wealth impact 
actual economic development, particularly in the non-oil economy and private sector? 
This study highlights the existence of economic development in the GCC states in three 
aspects: the current demographic structure, economic growth and diversification, and the 
role of private sector development. The analysis shows that an unbalanced population 
structure causes a great drain on national income and turns the national population into a 
minority in some of the GCC states. Furthermore, the GCC countries’ economy still 
depends heavily on oil revenue, resulting in public sector domination. As a result, the 
private sector is underdeveloped and still does not exert significant influence on 
economic development. The study concludes that, in spite of the declaration of the GCC 
articles of association regarding the link between development and integration, the GCC 
is still far from demonstrating real long-term development. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established between six Arab oil-exporting 
countries located in the Arab Peninsula in 1981, its primary aim was to achieve socio-
economic development and cooperation, which would eventually lead to economic 
integration, as declared in its articles of association. Among the stated objectives are the 
following (GCC Secretariat General 2013): 
 to formulate similar regulations in various fields, such as religion, finance, trade, 
customs, tourism, legislation and administration; 
 to foster scientific and technical progress in industry, mining, agriculture, water 
and animal resources; 
 to establish scientific research centres; 
 to set up joint ventures; 
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 to establish a unified military presence (Peninsula Shield Force); 
 to encourage the cooperation of the private sector; 
 to strengthen ties among the peoples of the gulf region; and 
 to establish a common currency. 
An additional driver for the establishment of the GCC was the Iranian Revolution in 
1979 and the widespread concern about Iran’s ambition to dominate the region and spread the 
Islamic revolution into the Arabian Gulf. Another important motive behind the creation of the 
GCC was to enhance the collective security of member states in the face of the Iran–Iraq War, 
which had begun a year earlier. 
The rulers of the Gulf States proposed the GCC, and the people of the region 
welcomed it, seeking a framework of political reform, economic development and integration, 
bearing in mind that the oil-producing states of the Arab Peninsula are part of the Arab world 
and have similar history, social roots, circumstances and demographic features. After more 
than three decades, however, the people’s hopes have not been realized. Although several 
suggestions have been made to the GCC government regarding the goal of attaining economic 
development and integration, there are still no indications that political reform and real 
economic development have been achieved in most of the GCC states. 
This paper discusses a number of critical economic weaknesses within the GCC states 
that, although highlighted over the decades of the GCC’s existence, have worsened in the most 
recent past. It is important to highlight these weaknesses now in the light of a number of 
possible risk factors. These include consequences of events in the Arab spring; Iran’s nuclear 
threat and its ambition to dominate the Arabian Gulf and the whole region, which have 
increased greatly since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and will not be ended by 
sending their troops against the Syrian uprising; combined with the American plan to establish 
the New Middle East – all of which signal an urgent demand not only for economic reform but 
also for security. 
This paper highlights economic weaknesses in terms of three aspects: demography 
(Section 2), economic statutes (Section 3) and the private sector (Section 4). The study 
concludes that population structure has presented a dilemma that has resulted in a large drain 
on the national income and has turned the national population into a minority in some GCC 
states. Furthermore, the economies of the Gulf States still depend heavily on oil revenues, 
resulting in public sector domination. As a result, the private sector is underdeveloped and has 
yet to establish an influential impact on economic development. The study concludes that, in 
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spite of the intent declared in the GCC articles of association regarding development and 
integration, the GCC is still far from initiating real long-term development. 
2. DEMOGRAPHY 
The combined population of the six GCC countries grew from nearly 10 million in 1975 to 
around 44 million by the end of 2010 (Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
2013). Saudi Arabia, by far the largest GCC country, accounted for around 62 per cent of the 
population in 2010, with an estimated 28 million people (Figure 1). The United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) was the second most populated GCC state, accounting for around 19 per cent or above 
8 million people. The distribution of the total GCC population was estimated at 6 per cent in 
each of Oman and Kuwait, 4 per cent in Qatar and 3 per cent in Bahrain (Cooperation Council 
for the Arab States of the Gulf 2013). 
The fast and sudden population growth witnessed by the GCC represents an increase of 
more than 300 per cent in less than forty years (Table 1). This growth coincides with the oil 
boom and is associated with the phenomenon of labour migration, which accounted for 46 per 
cent of the total GCC population in 2010 and almost 62 per cent of the total labour force 
(Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011). 
The phenomenon of labour migration in the Arabian Gulf commenced during the 
1940s with the discovery of oil in the region, but it highlighted a problem during the first oil 
boom in 1973. Subsequent to the first (1973) and second (1982) oil booms, the dilemma of an 
unbalanced population structure began and clearly worsened due to high emigration. For 
example, in 1975, the total population for the six countries was 10 million, of which 
Figure 1. Population composition among the GCC states, 2010 
Source: Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (2013). 
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expatriates accounted for 26 per cent. The total labour force in this year was 2.9 million, of 
which migrant labour constituted 45 per cent. During the second oil boom, the total population 
in this area increased to 12 million, and the total labour force was around 4 million, of which 
migrant labour exceeded 54 per cent (GCC Secretariat General 2006–12; Al-Ibrahim 2004). 
After the mid-1980s, a prevailing expectation was that an imbalance in the population 
structure would result in a sharp decrease in oil price, with a consequent reduction in oil 
revenues that would lead to a deficit in the government budget. Accordingly, a number of 
government policies were established to nationalize the labour force in order to reduce the 
imbalance in the population structure; however, despite these factors, the expatriate labour 
force has continued to grow rapidly, thus increasing the problem of imbalance. By 2001, the 
Secretariat General of the GCC countries reported that the GCC population had increased to 
32 million, and the ratio of expatriates to the total population had increased to 34 per cent, 
compared with 26 per cent in 1975. Moreover, the ratio of non-citizens to the total labour 
force reached 65 per cent, having been 45 per cent in 1975 (Table 1). 
The total population during the third oil boom of 2008 increased to over 40 million, 
and expatriates accounted for approximately 49 per cent, while the total labour force was 
around 15 million, of which non-citizens totalled 70 per cent. 
In the GCC states overall, the foreign labour force is concentrated mostly in the private 
sector (Table 2). In Qatar, however, the foreign labour force is significant in both the public 
sector (56 per cent) and the private sector (99 per cent). The Qatari labour force, in the private 
sector, recorded no more than 9,800 labourers, while non-citizens reached 1.01 million in 
2010 (Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 2013). 
The low rate of wages and salaries of the national labour force in the private sector 
relative to the public sector is the most often repeated explanation; however, the reasons for 
the low rate of the Qatari labour force in the private sector might be more complex. The most 
critical reason is the failure of the whole private sector system to play a significant role in 
overall development; this notion will be discussed in Section 4. 
It is important to note here that, due to the success resulting (to some extent) from 
adopting the employment policy of a national labour force, the non-citizen labour force 
decreased from 86 per cent in Bahrain and 79 per cent in Oman in 2001 to 76 per cent in both 
countries in 2010 (GCC Secretariat General 2006–12). 
The Bahrain government adopted a number of policies to minimize the imbalance in 
the population structure but faced a number of difficulties. The Bahrain Economic Vision 2030 
plan, which was launched in 2008, indicated that it aimed to nationalize the labour force,  
Table 1. GCC population and labour force, 1975–2010 (thousands) 
 
Sources: GCC Secretariat General (2006–12); Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (2013); Al-Ibrahim (2004) for 1975 data; *Forstenlechner and Rutledge (2011), 
since these values are not available in the Gulf Cooperation Council statistics. 
 
 
State 1975 2001 2008 2010 
Population Labour force Population Labour force Population Labour force Population Labour force 
Total 
Non-
citizen 
(%) Total 
Non- 
citizen 
(%) Total 
Non-
citizen 
(%) Total 
Non-
citizen 
(%) Total 
Non-
citizen 
(%) Total 
Non-
citizen 
(%) Total 
Non-
citizen 
(%) Total 
Non-
citizen 
(%) 
Bahrain  267 22 79 50 
           
651  38 
           
308  86 
        
1,103  51 468 75 
        
1,235  54 497 76 
Kuwait 1,027 54 298 71 
        
2,243  62 
        
1,214  80 
        
2,496  60 
        
1,449  84 
        
2,673  60 NA   83* 
Oman 846 16 192 54 
        
2,478  26 
           
705  79 
        
2,867  31 110 75 
        
2,773  29 1,297 75 
Qatar 180 71 74 83 
           
597  70 
           
323  85 
        
1,448  90 1,168 94 
        
1,715  85 
   
1,271* 94 
Saudi Arabia 7,334 19 1,968 34 
      
22,690  26 
        
6,090  50 
      
24,807  27 7,956 54 
      
27,563  31 8,835 55 
United Arab 
Emirates 551 61 292 58 
        
3,488  78 
        
2,079  91 
        
8,074  89 2,930 93 
        
8,264  89 NA   96* 
Total 10,205 26 2,903 45 
      
32,147  34 
      
10,719  65 
      
40,796  49 15,067 70 
      
44,223  46 NA   62* 
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Table 2. Foreign labour force in the public and private sectors in GCC states, 2010 (%) 
State Public Private 
Bahrain 13 82 
Kuwait 27 NA 
Oman 14 84 
Qatar 56 99 
Saudi Arabia   5 78 
United Arab Emirates NA NA 
Source: Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (2013). 
Note. Saudi Arabia information is for 2009. 
 
especially in the private sector; however, it also mentioned that nationalizing the labour force 
in the private sector is difficult (Hvidt 2013). Before the economic vision was created, the 
Bahrain government in cooperation with international organizations and advisors achieved an 
adopted package of solutions aiming to reform the labour market, reducing dependence on 
foreign workers and encouraging employers to hire local labourers. The government also 
developed the Labour Market Regularity Authority, and furthermore established the 
‘Tamkeen’1 (Empowerment) Fund by August 2006, as part of Bahrain’s national reform 
initiatives, supporting the country’s private sector and positioning it as the key driver of 
economic development. Tamkeen’s two primary objectives are (1) to foster the creation and 
development of enterprises and (2) to provide support to enhance the productivity and growth 
of enterprises and individuals. The solution is based on a number of scheduled policies leading 
to a gradual adjustment of foreign workers and Bahraini citizens. For instance, it imposed a 
new fee on each foreign labourer; however, when the government imposed some of these 
adjustment regulations, many small business owners, fishermen and small constructors 
initiated strikes and protests. In one case, some protestors stormed the building of the Labour 
Market Regulatory Authority, verbally attacking the staff and executives in August 2010. All 
of this opposition led the government to freeze its initiatives and reconsider its decision to 
nationalize the labour force. 
Similarly, the Ministry of Saudi Labour, approved in November 2012, imposed fees on 
private sector companies whose expatriate workers exceeded Saudi employees in number. 
This decision aimed to raise the level of Saudization in the private sector, which is currently 
based on expatriate labour (Middle East 2012). The decision was widely criticized and 
                                                 
1
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rejected by small- to medium-sized business owners as well as the ‘Majles Al-Shoura’ 
(Consultative Council), though it is supported by large business owners
2
 and academics. 
The case of the UAE and Qatar is the direst, as the national population has become the 
minority. For example, in the UAE, the citizen population constitutes no more than 11 per cent 
of the total population and only 4 per cent of the labour force. The UAE national labour force 
comprises only 2 per cent of the workforce of Dubai, while over 50 per cent are from India 
(Randeree 2012: 8). The case is similar to that in Qatar, where citizens make up only 15 per 
cent of the population, and the national labour force is approximately 5 per cent (Table 1). The 
total population of Qatar nearly tripled in just five years − from 700,000 in 2007 to 1.9 million 
in 2011 (IMF 2013) − and with almost another decade of development before the 2022 World 
Cup, it is expected to surge again. 
The UAE and Qatar recorded the world’s highest ratio of immigrant employment, 
which has risen to an average of 90 per cent since the late 1980s (Baldwin-Edwards 2011). 
This enormous domination of the foreign labour force includes not only low-skilled labour 
(workers) but also skilled foreign labour, due to the lack of the full range of required skill sets 
(e.g. engineers, scientists, university professors) in the national population (Forstenlechner and 
Rutledge 2011). However, the UAE and Qatar, the richest countries in the GCC and the world, 
have not yet adopted an adequate, clear and successful strategy
3
 for investing their huge 
wealth to develop a national labour force that will reduce the numbers of those in the skilled 
foreign labour force. 
The imbalance in the population structure and the huge expatriate labour force have 
caused a drain on the national income and the repatriation of large wages and salaries to 
labour-exporting countries (Table 3). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has shown that 
outward remittances from the GCC region stood at US$75 billion in 2011, rising from US$66 
billion in 2010 (Khaleej Times 2011). Outward remittances from Saudi Arabia reached US$23 
billion in 2013: 15 per cent higher than 2012.
4
 The ratio of sent remittances to GDP in the 
GCC states appears to be the highest in the world (Naufal and Termos 2010). 
Given such expatriate remittances, the demand for foreign currencies increases, 
reducing the value of the local currency. Consequently, if the central bank is willing to 
maintain the value of the local currency, then it must hold extraordinary foreign reserves to 
preserve the pegged exchange rate. Then again, such transactions would lead to a high supply  
                                                 
2
 Such as Al-Waled Ben Talal and Saleh Kamel. 
3
 Labour nationalization policies have been declared in all GCC states but have all failed. 
4
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Table 3. Migration and remittances in GCC states, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2011). 
Note. For further information, see Naufal and Termos (2010). 
 
of the local currency. This problem could be minimized by converting these funds to the 
economy if the central bank is willing to offset the remittance effect by using treasury bonds. 
Since there are extremely inadequate government securities in the GCC that the central banks 
can utilize, the effect of remittances will remain contractionary, thus reducing the money 
multiplier in the economy (Taghavi 2012). 
Although these are old issues that have been discussed and highlighted since the early 
1970s, the continuity and permanence of the unbalanced population structure and the 
ignorance about this problem in some GCC states − particularly Qatar and the UAE − might 
provide sufficient evidence that the imbalance is not a consequence of poor government 
planning but rather a result of government adoption of such a policy to reduce citizen 
influence. For example, if the UAE national labour force goes on strike, this will not place 
pressure on the UAE government; and the Qatari government has retired a significant number 
of national labourers (at less than 60 years of age) over the past few years and replaced them 
with an expatriate labour force. For instance, the number of Qatari faculty members at Qatar 
University decreased from 46 per cent to less than 30 per cent, while non-Qatari faculty 
members jumped from 54 per cent to 70 per cent.
5
 
3. THE ECONOMY 
No one can ignore the fact that the GCC states represent an important region in the world and 
provide a framework for the stability of oil and gas supplies globally. These countries own 
approximately 45 per cent of the world’s crude oil reserves and around 15 per cent of natural 
                                                 
5
 These percentages came from the website of Qatar University (2011), but they have not been available recently. 
State       Remittances sent 
 US$ billion Percentage of GDP 
Bahrain NA  7 
Kuwait 10.0  8 
Oman  5.3 10 
Qatar NA NA 
Saudi Arabia 26.0  6 
United Arab 
Emirates 
  NA NA 
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gas reserves. Furthermore, they account for nearly 15 per cent of the international production 
of crude oil, and their crude oil exports represent around 20 per cent of total international 
exports (IMF 2013; Al-Ibrahim 2004). Their sum total GDP is among the largest in the world 
in relation to population. The total GDP for 2011 reached US$1.4 trillion; the largest national 
GDP was that of Saudi Arabia (US$597 billion), approximately 43 per cent of the total GCC 
states’ GDP, and the smallest national GDP was that of Bahrain at US$26 billion, or about 1.9 
per cent (IMF 2013) (Figure 2). 
However, it is the crude oil revenues (as opposed to production) that dominate the 
GCC economy and economic growth. These revenues are the key controller of GDP, national 
income and state budget of each of the GCC states. Therefore, the GCC economy has become 
subject to the international market, and any economic growth and budget surplus or deficit are 
no more than outcomes of oil prices in the international market. 
Historically, most oil booms (e.g. 1973–4, 1979–82, 1990–1, 2003) have been related 
to regional and international political and military crises (Al-Faris 2009) (Figure 3). For 
instance, during the October 1973 war, six Arab Gulf states decided to reduce oil production 
by 5 per cent per month and raise oil prices from US$2.90 to US$5.11 per barrel (Al-Yousef 
2011). The states made this decision unilaterally without consulting the oil companies. This 
was considered a historical precedent for the independence of the Gulf States in decisions 
related to pricing and production. Subsequently, oil prices increased, reaching US$13 in 1978. 
The Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Iran–Iraq War and the Soviet Union’s involvement in 
Afghanistan also led to oil booms, and, in 1980, oil prices jumped to US$42 per barrel. They 
then began to decrease. Non-OPEC members, such as Mexico, Russia and Alaska, which had 
been unable to produce oil in the past due to low prices, were motivated by the high prices to 
Figure 2. Distribution of GCC GDP, 2011 
 
Source: IMF (2013). 
Bahrain 
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Figure 3. History of oil prices, 1947–2011 
 
Source: WTRG Economics (2013). 
Note. For further information, see Al-Sadoon (2009). 
 
start producing oil, which increased the supply. On the other hand, high oil prices succeeded 
in reducing international demand for oil by six million barrels per day (Al-Yousef 2011). 
For the first time in its history, OPEC imposed on its members specific production 
quotas to deal with the new market conditions. The scheduled production ceiling in March 
1982 was 17.5 million barrels per day, which represented half of the OPEC members’ 
previous productivity. However, Iran under the Khomeini regime decided not to abide by 
OPEC’s quotas. Iran’s oil production increased, and Nigeria followed suit. Saudi Arabia 
reduced its production from 10.5 million barrels per day in 1980 to 2.2 million barrels per day 
in 1985 (Al-Yousef 2011). Oil prices collapsed to less than US$10 per barrel by May 1986. 
They remained around US$18 per barrel from 1987 to 1999, except for 1990, when the price 
of crude oil spiked from US$17 per barrel in July to US$36 per barrel in August as a result of 
Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. As a result of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, oil 
prices doubled, and they have continued to increase since then due to a weak dollar and the 
fast growth of the Asian economies as well as the accompanying increase in their petroleum 
consumption (WTRG Economics 2013). 
On 11 July 2008, oil prices peaked at US$147.27, as global concern mounted over 
missile tests in Iran. The price subsequently collapsed during the global financial turmoil 
sparked by the subprime crisis. During the economic recession in 2009, oil prices traded at 
between US$35 and US$82 a barrel, recording an average of US$61 a barrel. In late February 
2011, prices jumped as a result of the loss of Libyan exports in the face of the Libyan uprising 
11 
 
and heightened uncertainty in the Middle East (OPEC 2013; WTRG Economics 2013). The 
price in August 2013 was around US$103. 
Oil price collapses usually have deep, long-term negative consequences for the GCC 
economy. For instance, the 1986 collapse transitioned most of the GCC states from creditor 
states into debtor states (Al-Sadoon 2009). The GCC states’ economy faced recession, 
deflation and a long period of deficit in state budgets, leading many of them to liquidate most 
of their overseas assets. The Qatari budget, for example, went into deficit from 1985 to 2000, 
with only one recorded surplus (1990–1) (Wright 2011). Saudi Arabia suffered seventeen 
consecutive years of deficit (Champion 2002). In spite of previous oil price collapses, the 
negative effects on economic stability were quickly forgotten as soon as the oil price began to 
increase again (2003–7). The worst consequence of this is that, rather than benefiting from the 
lessons of the past, governments have increased their dependency on oil and decreased their 
willingness to initiate economic integration. 
3.1. Gross domestic product (GDP) 
Oil and gas represent the most important sources of income and comprise the largest sector of 
the GCC’s GDP (49 per cent of total GDP in 2011). The highest percentage was accrued in 
Qatar, with 55 per cent of GDP, while the lowest was in Bahrain, with 25 per cent on average 
for the period of 2000–10 (IMF 2013; World Bank 2013). It is important to note that, with the 
overall oil booms and crises, oil income remains the critical and predominant source of GDP 
in the GCC. Figures 4 and 5 show identical movement for GDP and oil prices. For instance, in 
1998, all of the GCC countries reported a decrease in GDP. This may be attributed to a 
dramatic decrease in international oil prices following an excess of supply, which in turn 
resulted from a reduction in oil demand by countries affected by the financial crisis in Asia. 
During this time, the average oil price reached US$12.60 per barrel for Brent, compared with 
US$19.12 of the previous year. The subsequent recovery in terms of oil demand, together with 
the success of OPEC in limiting oil supplies, led to an increase in economic growth after 1998. 
A similar event took place when OPEC oil prices jumped to US$100 per barrel in 2008, 
followed by a sharp increase in the average GDP from US$900 billion in 2007 to US$1.13 
trillion in 2008 (an increase of 25 per cent). However, in 2009, due to the international 
financial crises, oil prices dropped to US$60 per barrel, followed by a sharp reduction in GDP, 
which fell by 24 per cent from the previous year (World Bank 2013). This represented the 
largest reduction in the previous fifteen years.
 
In 2011, GDP was US$1.4 trillion as a result of 
high oil prices, which exceeded US$107 per barrel (OPEC 2013; World Bank 2013). This  
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Figure 4. GDP and oil income of GCC states, 1995–2011 
 
Sources: IMF (2013); World Bank (2013); OPEC (2013).  
 
Figure 5. GDP of GCC states and oil market prices, 1999–2011 
 
 
 Sources: World Bank (2013); OPEC (2013). 
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strong association between international market demand and national GDP shows the 
international market’s influence on the national GDP. 
Furthermore, dependence on oil as a main export product renders the GDP of GCC 
countries vulnerable to fluctuations in the international market. The data from the period of 
1970–2010 demonstrate this (Figure 6). Figure 7 shows that world oil demand controls GDP 
and also demonstrates the influence on real GDP, the consumer price index (CPI), the budget 
balance and the current account. 
Behind the oil and gas sector, the services sector is the second largest in terms of GDP 
for all GCC states (see also Al-Ibrahim 2004). From 2000 to 2009, services averaged 20 per 
cent of GDP in the GCC states, ranging between 15 per cent in Qatar and 24 per cent in 
Bahrain (Arab Monetary Fund 2013), as illustrated in Table 4. The government played a 
significant role in this sector’s activities (e.g. public administration, defence, health, education, 
welfare) in terms of the services it provided in most of the GCC states, as shown in Figure 8 
(QNB 2012). 
The manufacturing industries sector accounted for an average of 10 per cent of GDP 
from 2000 to 2009 (Arab Monetary Fund 2013). This contribution ranged from 6 per cent in 
Kuwait to 13 per cent in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (Table 4). The manufacturing industries of 
the GCC states are based largely on oil and gas, a fact that reflects the limited development of 
other manufacturing industries. The agriculture sector is the smallest, accounting for an  
Figure 6. GDP growth rate in GCC states, 1970–2010 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
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Figure 7. Influence of market oil prices on consumer price index (CPI), budget balance and 
current account in GCC states, 2008–11 
 
Source: SAMBA (2012). 
 
Figure 8. Role of government services in total services in GCC states, 2009 
 
Source: QNB (2012). 
 
average of no more than 1.3 per cent of GDP from 2000 to 2009. In some countries, 
agriculture contributed less than 1 per cent to GDP (Arab Monetary Fund 2013). Table 4 
presents the average percentage contribution of services, manufacturing industries and the 
agriculture sector to GDP for 2000–9 (see also Al-Ibrahim 2004). 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Oil price (US$/b) 99.2 62.3 79.5 111 
Real GDP (%) changed 7% 0% 5% 7% 
CPI (average % change) 11% 3% 3% 4% 
Budget balance (% of GDP) 22% -2% 5% 13% 
Current account (% of GDP) 24% 7% 15% 16% 
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Table 4. Average rate of services, manufacturing industries and agriculture sectors in GCC 
states, 2000–9 (%) 
State Service sector Manufacturing 
industries sector 
Agriculture sector 
Bahrain 24 13 0.5 
Kuwait 21 6 0.3 
Oman 20 10 1.5 
Qatar 15 9 0.1 
Saudi Arabia 22 10 3.5 
United Arab 
Emirates 
17 13 1.8 
Total average 20.1 10.2 1.3 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund (2013). 
 
According to the IMF’s estimate, the fluctuation in oil prices is also reflected in the per 
capita income of the GCC countries. For example, due to the steady increase in oil prices, 
GDP per capita income jumped from US$32,100 in 2006 to US$42,800 in 2008. When oil 
prices retreated in 2009, per capita income also fell back, to US$32,000 once again; then, 
when oil prices advanced to US$107 per barrel in 2011, per capita income rose to US$46,700 
(IMF 2013) (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. GDP per capita in GCC states, 2006–11(US$) 
State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Bahrain 21,155.91 24,171.20 28,416.17 18,562.76 20,258.95 23,132.32 
Kuwait 31,907.18 33,732.55 42,823.70 30,391.22 34,712.99 47,982.43 
Oman 13,784.25 15,369.36 21,745.19 16,255.18 19,404.77 23,315.46 
Qatar 58,382.72 64,872.26 79,409.17 59,544.59 74,901.42 98,329.49 
Saudi Arabia 14,784.45 15,444.42 18,495.40 14,148.34 16,376.80 20,504.36 
United Arab 
Emirates 
52,519.71 57,520.09 66,074.44 53,362.62 57,042.85 67,007.98 
GCC average 32,089.03 35,184.98 42,827.34 32,044.12 37,116.30 46,712.01 
Source: IMF (2013). 
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3.2. Public finance 
As indicated in their GDP, all of the GCC states’ public revenues depend largely on oil 
revenues, which account for at least two-thirds of total revenues (Figure 9). Between 2000 and 
2008, oil revenues ranged from 67 per cent in Qatar to 84 per cent in Kuwait (Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 2013). Accordingly, revenue from other sources is 
limited, especially non-oil tax revenue, which provides no more than 8 per cent of public 
revenue in the GCC countries. These averages validate the assertion that oil revenue remains 
the backbone of the government budget in GCC countries; in other words, budget revenue is 
dominated by the international market and its economies (Al-Yousef 2011; Al-Ibrahim 2004). 
Public expenditure is divided into two main categories: capital expenditure and current 
expenditure. However, the determinant of revenue allocation for each category of expenditure 
depends on whether total public revenues have a surplus or a deficit. In other words, allocation 
depends on the oil price in the international market. 
Thus, in developing countries such as the GCC states, capital expenditure assumes 
special importance, since it is linked to civilian infrastructure projects and public utilities 
expenditure as well as maintenance expenditure for these projects; hence, a long-term plan is 
required for the capital budget. However, this requirement is not always met in the GCC 
states, where capital investment expenditure was 49 per cent of total revenues between the late 
1970s and the mid-1980s, when oil revenues were high. On the other hand, capital investment 
expenditure was around 16 per cent between 1996 and 2001 in most GCC countries because of 
low oil prices, while this amount increased slightly to 23 per cent for the period of 2002–8, 
when oil prices increased (Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 2013; Al-
Ibrahim 2004). This indicates that capital expenditure is directly associated with oil revenues. 
Figure 9. Oil revenues and total revenues in GCC states, 2005–8 
 
 Source: Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (2013). 
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In contrast, current expenditure can be described as continuous incremental 
expenditure when oil revenue is high, but it is resistant to control and not subject to reduction 
when the oil price declines. This type of expenditure, which includes salaries and wages for all 
government ministries, has increased continually. For the period of 2005–8, this expenditure 
reached between 77 per cent and 83 per cent as an average of public expenditure in most GCC 
countries (Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 2013) (Figure 10). 
The reason for this problem is related mainly to the current policies concerning wages 
and salary expenditures. Salary expenditures increase from year to year because of the 
weakness of the private sector in attracting the nations’ labour as well as the GCC 
governments’ role as the main employers of their economy’s labour forces. As a result of the 
growth of salaries and the social and political need to employ nationals, a substantial gap 
exists between the public and private sectors in terms of salaries and conditions of 
employment. 
3.3. Impact of oil dependency 
The sole dependency on crude oil exports creates several problems, among which are the 
dependence of the national economy on the international market and the domination of the 
public sector. 
3.3.1. Pressure from the international market on the national economy 
The reliance on unstable and exogenous economic sources, such as the revenue from crude oil 
exports, enlarges the influence of the international market on GDP and manipulates the 
national income, total expenditure and revenues of the balance of payments. In other words,  
Figure 10. Current expenditure and budget surplus in GCC states, 2005–8 
 
Source: Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (2013).  
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such dependency leaves the GCC states as open countries in the international economy, and 
consequently, the GCC is strongly susceptible to economic forces caused by fluctuations in 
the international market, in both oil and imported goods. The GCC states have a high level of 
market openness compared to the world average (Figure 11). Foreign trade accounted for 90 
per cent of total trade for the GCC states, while internal trade between the GCC states was 
around 10 per cent from 2000 to 2010. Internal trade was almost 4 per cent in 2008 (Figure 
12) (World Bank 2013; Al-Yousef 2011; Al-Shibiby and Kari 2012). In spite of the GCC’s 
heavy reliance on external trade and the foreign labour market, over thirty years after its 
formation, the GCC has still not adopted a policy that minimizes the factors leading to these  
Figure 11. Level of market openness in GCC states, 2000–11 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
Note. The level of market openness is determined by merchandise traded as a share of GDP, which is computed 
as the sum of merchandise exports and imports, divided by the value of GDP. 
 
Figure 12. Level of market openness in GCC states, 2008 
 
Source: Al-Shibiby and Kari (2012). 
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circumstances which render the GCC so vulnerable to fluctuations in the international market. 
This is in spite of the fact that it can minimize such problems practically by applying revenue 
surpluses to create integral non-oil industries (Al-Shibiby and Kari 2012). 
Furthermore, in the light of the heavy reliance on oil revenues, along with the lack of 
taxes, the state’s budget formulates a public finance policy that is vastly responsive to 
international factors. Exemption from high income taxes prevents social justice among 
individuals (Al-Ibrahim 2004). 
3.3.2. Domination of the public sector 
The government controls the most vital national asset – oil – and this control is manifested 
through extensive governmental intervention in economic activities. Thus, oil revenue gives 
the government permission to make economic decisions, regardless of the private sector’s 
needs. These circumstances weaken the role of the private sector and create a subordinated 
relationship between the private and public sectors. Due to the private sector’s dependency on 
policies and plans for public expenditure and government spending, the government’s control 
and intervention in economic activities hinder the role of the private sector and restrict its 
development (Al-Kuwari 2012). Also, due to the limited size and extent of the private sector, 
it is inadequate to employ the national labour force. 
The next section will discuss the private sector in the GCC states in greater detail. 
4. PRIVATE SECTOR 
The success of the private sector in capitalist countries, combined with the collapse of the 
communist regime of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, highlights the importance of the 
role that an efficient private sector can play in a country’s economic development. A large 
number of empirical studies support the assertion that private sector investment is more 
efficient than public investment and has a stronger impact on economic growth. Private 
investment also counts as a resource of wealth, dynamism, competitiveness and knowledge 
(e.g. Frimpong and Marbuah 2010; Klein and Hadjimichael 2003; Khan and Kumar 1997). 
The private sector plays a fundamental role not only in meeting the existing goals of 
economic development but also in overall development efforts. As the private sector increases 
its productivity, jobs and income are created. This can lead to a fair and balanced diffusion of 
the benefits of growth between people; it can also reduce poverty and increase opportunities 
for integrating women into economic production. Moreover, the private sector is able to create 
greater competition, market forces and profit drive, factors that intensify tax-based and 
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market-based policy instruments for tackling social and environmental challenges. A tax-
based economy creates social justice and reduces the gap between different levels of society 
(ADB 2000; OECD 1995). 
Theoretical points of view and the success of practical cases around the world (e.g. 
Asian Tigers) clearly show that the transition to greater economic efficiency and the 
advantages accrued from such efficiency can be achieved by tackling the relevant challenges; 
however, these advantages cannot be achieved in an environment that lacks transparency and a 
developed strategy based on an effective public sector. More recently, these theories have 
asserted that success in private sector development requires the government to play an 
effective role in creating a protected and stable business environment by formulating and 
implementing a strategy that identifies targeted outcomes and instruments. Furthermore, such 
success requires an operation-based public and private sector. Thus, the public sector is 
responsible mainly for creating effective conditions and business opportunities, while the 
private sector is required to catalyze private investment, as suggested by the Asian 
Development Bank. Such a form and the role of private sector development are essential for 
the GCC states, particularly in terms of capital formation, economic diversification and 
employment generation (Hertog 2012). These factors will reduce the dependence on a sole and 
exhaustible resource – crude oil – thereby lessening the public sector’s domination. The 
development of the private sector will also shrink the dependency of the national economy on 
international oil demand and establish a good economic level, even when oil prices are low. 
However, evidence shows that each of the GCC states is reluctant to establish an 
efficient private sector. The World Bank (2009) presented a valuable study appraising the 
private sector’s development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This study 
indicates that private sector investment is obviously poor in oil-rich countries, GCC states in 
particular. Surprisingly, private sectors with rich economic resources, such as those in the 
GCC states, exhibit characteristics similar to those in countries with poor economic resources 
around the world. This study shows that, in 2006, private sector investment was 50 per cent of 
total investment in oil-rich countries, which was even less than that of non-oil-rich MENA 
economies (62 per cent). It was also less than that of East Asia and Pacific Europe (70 per 
cent), Europe and Central Asia (80 per cent) and Latin American and the Caribbean (95 per 
cent) for 2006. Ironically, the resource-rich GCC states are parallel to countries with poor 
economic resources. Furthermore, and in consequence of a poor legal environment along with 
high business risk and lack of investment opportunities, the GCC states are less attractive for 
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foreign direct investment (FDI). In fact, FDI accounted for no more than 1 per cent of private 
sector investment from 1970 until very recently.
6
 
Further evidence of the weakness of the private sector can be seen in the case of the 
stock exchange, which will be discussed in the following section. 
4.1. Stock exchanges in the GCC states 
In order to develop and activate the private sectors of the GCC countries and to encourage 
them gradually to generate funds to invest internationally, there is a crucial need to restructure 
private sector incentives. It is worth mentioning here that the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) 
estimates that GCC private sector investment abroad was US$2,400 billion in 2005 (Al-Raya 
Al-Eqtisadya 2005). Therefore, one of the first steps towards developing the private sector was 
the decision to establish a stock market to mobilize private sector investment. 
All of the GCC member states have established formally regulated stock exchanges 
that provide a mechanism for ordinary investors to participate in the region’s economic growth 
and an alternative to bank borrowing for the financing of private and state projects. Although 
these stock exchanges have functioned formally and informally in the GCC since the 1970s, 
until fairly recently it was quite difficult to find reliable and consistent data on the size and 
growth of these markets (Al-Kuwari 2012). The existing information illustrates a vast increase 
in stock market activity since the early 1990s. At the end of 1991, 184 companies were listed 
on the stock markets of the GCC states; by the end of 2011, the total number of listed 
companies in the GCC stock markets reached 632. The Kuwait Stock Exchange has the largest 
number of listed companies (216), while the Qatar Stock Exchange has the smallest (42 
companies) (Arab Monetary Fund 2013). 
The combined market capitalization of the GCC states’ stock exchanges increased 
almost tenfold, from US$102 billion in 2000 to US$1.05 trillion in 2007, before contracting 
significantly in the wake of the global financial crisis (World Bank 2013) (Figure 13). The 
turnover ratio, which is computed as value traded to market capitalization and which can be 
employed as a functional ratio evaluating the activity level in the market (Kumar and 
Tsetsekos 1999), is increasing. The aggregate ratio was around 70 per cent between the late 
1990s and the early 2000s. This ratio was duplicated in 2004 and leapt to 500 per cent in 2007 
before decreasing gradually in the following years (World Bank 2013; Qatar Central Bank 
2006). 
                                                 
6
 See also Al-Yousef (2011) for further information. 
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Figure 13. Market capitalization in GCC states, 1997–2011 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
Compared to the rest of the Arab stock exchanges, the GCC states captured an average 
of almost 80 per cent of total market capitalization of these exchanges from 2009 to 2012 
(Figure 14), while the value-traded ratio exceeded 88 per cent of the total value traded on the 
Arab stock exchanges (Figure 15). These ratios indicate that the stock exchanges of the GCC 
states are the largest and most active among the Arab stock exchanges (Arab Monetary Fund 
2013). 
Figure 14. Comparison of market capitalization between the stock exchanges of GCC states and other 
Arab stock exchanges, 2009–12 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
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Figure 15. Comparison of value traded between the stock exchanges of GCC states and other 
Arab stock exchanges, 2009–12 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
However, a comparison between the GCC stock exchanges’ investable price indices7 
and the Brent oil price for 2008–12 shows that investors’ behaviour and decisions regarding 
risk and value follow fluctuations in oil prices (Figure 16). Furthermore, Figures 17 and 18 
show that the bulk of the increases in market capitalization and stock turnover positively 
follow international oil prices. This is also supported by a simple regression model over the  
Figure 16. Oil prices and market index, 2008–12 
 
Sources: OPEC (2013); Standard & Poor (2013). 
 
                                                 
7
 The Standard & Poor (S&P) GCC indices include stocks from listed companies in the GCC. The indices are 
offered in international (investable), regional (composite) and local (domestic) versions and are calculated seven 
days a week in order to capture the actual trading days of the local markets. 
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Figure 17. Oil prices and capitalization, 1999–2011 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
Figure 18. Oil prices and turnover ratio, 1999–2011 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
period 1999–2011 (Figures 19 and 20). The results highlight a positive and significant 
relationship, implying that the oil price can explain around 42 per cent of market capitalization 
and 63 per cent of stock turnover trends. These values are high for a long period of time  
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Figure 19. Relationship between oil prices and capitalization, 1999–2011 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
Figure 20. Relationship between oil prices and turnover ratio, 1999–2011 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
(1999–2011). This finding is consistent with several numbers from econometric studies, which 
investigate a positive relationship over the short and long term between oil prices and stock 
markets and support the positive effect of oil prices on the stock exchanges of the GCC states 
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(e.g. Arouri and Fouquau 2009; Arouri et al. 2011; Lescaroux and Mignon 2008; Maghyereh 
and Al-Kandari 2007; Zarour 2006; Hammoudeh and Aleisa 2004). 
This argument is also in line with claims made by corporate executives and economists 
at the Reuters Middle East Investment Summit (2012), who stated that private business 
activity in most of the region was thriving again after four years of facing plummeting oil 
prices ravaging the economies of the GCC states; however, they also argued that the private 
sector’s gains were vulnerable, warning that growth could quickly become sluggish if oil 
prices retreated or if governments exercised slow spending in order to conserve their financial 
reserves. This is consistent with the views of Liz Martins, senior regional economist at HSBC 
in 2012, who stated that the 2012 healthy growth in the private sector had roots in government 
spending and argued that there are structural impediments to longer-term private sector growth 
(Arabian Business 2012). 
Furthermore, the capital markets within the GCC have been criticized for being 
unsophisticated and inefficient relative to similar emerging markets. Capital markets are 
known as long-term sources of capital, including debt and equity-backed securities. These 
markets serve as channels between the wealth of savers and those who can apply it to long-
term productive utilization, such as companies’ or governments’ long-term investments. 
According to this definition, capital markets within the GCC states are very limited in scope 
and instruments. Particular shortcomings include the following: (1) a lack of resources for 
lending and borrowing securities – for example, bonds are not accessible as a substitute for 
shares in most GCC markets; (2) the absence of any pressure on corporations to pay regular 
dividends; and (3) the volatility of the stock exchanges, which are also characterized by a high 
degree of information asymmetry. 
Debt and equity capital markets are small and limited in a way that creates an obstacle 
to raising funds for small- and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, it is hard to obtain 
bank loans, given that most banks in GCC states are traditionally unwilling to lend to small, 
little-known firms, preferring instead the security and predictability of lending to large firms, 
such as those with state connections, as explained by the senior regional economist at HSBC 
(Arabian Business 2012). 
In addition, owing to the undeveloped capital market and lack of a bonds (debt) market 
in most of the GCC states, GCC corporations finance their activities with an increase in 
primary issuance (Woertz 2008). Furthermore, retained earnings become the key basis of 
financing capital requirements. Almost all corporations use their profits to form public 
reserves, which are distributed largely as free shares to increase equity capital. Such a policy 
27 
 
shifts the attention of shareholders from cash dividends to the appreciation of the market value 
of shares (Arab Monetary Fund 1995). The high dependency on equity capital on account of 
debt capital might increase agency problems, as managers take advantage of their authority to 
benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders’ interests; however, a sophisticated bond 
(debt) market, together with an obligation to devise a regular dividend payout ratio, might 
reduce such a problem. 
Thus, bonds issuance enables corporations to establish high cash dividend payouts and 
fund their investment projects through the capital market. Paying of cash dividends reduces 
the free cash flow available to managers and compels them to disclose significant information. 
It also enhances information transparency and improves managers’ performance in accordance 
with shareholders’ interests. In short, bonds can play a significant role in long-term project 
financing and reduce the agency problem. This argument is consistent with capital structure 
theory, which emphasizes that capital structure should include debt capital (e.g. bonds) in 
order to reduce debt and agency conflict (Hart and Moore 1995, 1998; Stulz 1990). 
Moreover, a GCC bond market could play an essential part in long-term project 
financing and portfolio diversification of the emerging GCC institutional investors’ class. It 
could furthermore work as a channel for small- and medium-sized enterprises to gain access to 
the capital market as an alternative to the bank system, which is not always available to this 
market segment (Woertz 2008). 
While governments appreciate the suggestion of developing a debt market and 
expanding credit, these activities still require both efficient monitoring of the soundness of the 
relevant financial system and supervision of the activities of individual institutions. Regular 
issuance of government debt to establish a yield curve would diversify the means of financing 
and assist bank liquidity management. Progress in building regulatory and transactional 
infrastructure would lead to the development of local debt markets for corporate issuers (IMF 
2012). 
Another critical problem is the high information asymmetry that exists in the GCC 
state markets. In a symmetrically informed market, all interested participants obtain similar 
information regarding a current situation and future prospects, such as their current and 
expected firm value and performance, including that of managers, bankers, shareholders and 
others; however, if one group has greater information, the problem of informational 
asymmetry arises. In the GCC market, managers and controlling shareholders usually have 
inside information regarding their firms’ value, performance, strategies and investment 
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opportunities. This results in an informational gap between insiders and outsiders, which in 
turn results in misinterpretation of the intrinsic value of the firm. 
This claim is in line with those of Hassan et al. (2003), Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) and 
Joshi and Al-Mudhahki (2001), who argue that information disclosure conditions are lax and 
suffer an information gap between inside and outside shareholders as a result of high 
information asymmetry and low corporate transparency, which in turn weaken market 
efficiency. The claim is also consistent with the work of Bley (2011), who argues that the 
GCC markets have weaker accounting standards and publication rules as well as low 
transparency, which hinders efficient information transmission. Furthermore, Al-Aqeel and 
Spear (2006) explore the prevalence of trading on private information in the GCC markets. Al-
Aqeel and Spear (2006) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) find that levels of illegal trading 
are high in the GCC market, where enforcement of insider trading regulations is ineffectual 
and indeed negligible. 
In one analytical study, the Kuwait Financial Center (2007) evaluates the stock 
exchanges of the GCC states in depth and compares them to a number of emerging markets, 
particularly Egypt from the MENA region and the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China), in order to present a fair evaluation. The results show that all of the GCC states are 
located at the tail end of the rank. This study argues that the major weakness of the GCC stock 
exchanges is that these markets have grown substantially in volume but not in sophistication. 
The study concludes that, in order to develop the securities markets significantly and to leap 
forward, GCC regulators and policymakers should set in place careful, fundamental and 
speedy reform; otherwise, they will lag. 
Most GCC countries have recently implemented corporate governance codes or 
guidelines for being publicly listed, and although they have willingly acknowledged the need 
for corporate governance reform, this acknowledgement has not been translated into action. 
They still have a long way to go before they reach good corporate governance, particularly in 
terms of transparency and disclosure, board practices and risk management (Saidi 2011). This 
argument is consistent with one of the first surveys, conducted in 2006, on the corporate 
governance of GCC countries by the Institute of International Finance (IIF) and Hawkamah − 
the Institute of Corporate Governance of the Arabic region. This survey found that, in general, 
corporate governance in GCC countries lags significantly behind international corporate 
governance best practice among emerging markets. 
A workshop held by the AMF and IMF in 2004 specified three stages necessary for 
reforms and the significant development of a capital market: the initial stage, which sets up the 
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primary market and creates the foundation for secondary-market development; the deepening 
stage, which enhances liquidity in the secondary market; and the maturing stage, which forms 
sophisticated instruments and segments the capital market. This workshop stressed that these 
three stages incorporate specific essential conditions: a stable macroeconomic environment, 
the lessons of fiscal dominance, a liberalized interest rate, and a solid commitment to market 
funding (El-Qorchi 2005). Until now, however, these conditions have been absent in the GCC 
countries, since their economies are still excessively dependent on oil revenues. ‘Diversify 
income sources’ is a motto commonly heard at times of budget deficit and ignored at times of 
surplus. 
The underdeveloped capital market of the GCC typifies the private sector trend in the 
GCC market. One reason for such a weak private sector might be related to the nature of the 
rentier state. The GCC state employs oil revenue as the key driver for any economic activities 
and economic growth within the private sector. Whereas capitalist economies, as a rule, 
reinforce tax cycles in the private sector, thus sequentially financing state expenditures, in the 
GCC states the absence of taxes separates the private sector from the state, thereby creating a 
unilateral relationship in which the private sector is dependent on the state and does not 
contribute to the financing of public services (Hertog 2012). 
However, the nature of the rentier is not the only driver for the failing private sector, as 
seen in the example of Norway, since it is a rentier state but has simultaneously been able to 
have a strong and well-developed private sector. This success of Norway as a rentier state, 
related to its elected government, protects public rather than personal interest. This form of 
government is absent in most of the GCC states (Al-Yousef 2011). 
Furthermore, competition in the private sector is absent to a large extent as a result of 
its small size and the extent of each market. More importantly, competition is absent because 
most business activities are manipulated by members of ruling families, or influential families 
that collaborate with these ruling families, so that no one can compete with them. The lack of 
appropriate legislation and regulation creates a private sector environment that is solely 
oriented towards the goal of profit maximization, regardless of its negative effect on society 
and overall development. There is no (or an extremely small) tax on profit, and the private 
sector is eager to realize excessive profit fast, which makes it unwilling to employ national 
labour. The private sector is not obligated to pay an acceptable minimum salary that enables 
the national workforce to cover living expenses (Al-Yousef 2011). 
It seems that some of the governments take such a route not only to maximize personal 
interest at the expense of development goals but also to maximize their domination of the 
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public and to control the national labour force (and national society as a whole). For instance, 
in some GCC countries, the governments can easily dismiss any employee who publicly 
criticizes government policies and performance or the internal policy or performance of 
governmental institutions. Thus, the possibility of criticism arising from the public is 
diminished by the strength of government authority, which results from domination of the 
public sector and the weakness of the private sector. 
In conclusion, the creation and development of a strong and effective private sector 
and integration with the public sector are possible. Initiatives that will significantly strengthen 
the private sector in the development process include the following: reforming legislation, 
regulations and corporate governance; empowering and improving a skilled national labour 
force; and adopting a substitution policy that reduces imbalances in the population structure 
and works towards economic integration, which increases competition. No one can ignore the 
environment of political participation that is required to enhance the above-mentioned factors, 
achieve balance between personal and social interests, and create transparency between the 
public and private sector. 
4.2. National visions and mission impossible 
Fostering a diversified economy (i.e. having a variety of sources of revenues and profitable 
sectors) plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of strong, growing and sustainable 
economies. Such economies urge entities to create jobs, enhance citizens’ quality of life, 
encourage the development of new knowledge and technology, and help to ensure a stable 
political climate (Shediac et al. 2008). 
However, the national plans and visions that have appeared recently in each of the 
GCC states lack a clear strategy for achieving real diversification. Indeed, the evidence 
indicates that, in most of these national visions and plans, the oil and gas sectors will continue 
to dominate the economy and will continue the policy of state control. There is no indication 
that economic development will facilitate participation between the public and private sectors 
in most of the GCC states. Moreover, development of the non-oil sector has resulted in very 
little impact on their economic growth. This evidence highlights a critical question: are all of 
these plans and national visions a sort of window dressing, or are they actual exercises? 
This argument is explored in a valuable and critical study by Hvidt (2013), who argues 
that the practical capabilities and ability to implement and achieve planning are quite 
vulnerable throughout the GCC countries, particularly when bearing in mind the broader and 
more complex reforms which ought to be implemented in order to see through the 
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diversification procedure. Hvidt states that such reforms require efficient and uniform 
performance within a broad range of ministries and agencies in the state bureaucracy, but 
more important is the states’ coordination among national, regional and local entities. In other 
words, such reforms necessitate a mature administrative apparatus, which currently is not 
found in the GCC countries (Hvidt 2013: 39). More specifically, Hvidt indicates that these 
plans and national visions are at an impasse as a result of several barriers. One such is the 
small size of the market in the GCC states (except Saudi Arabia) along with the duplication of 
economic activities among them and lack of inter-regional trade. The GCC visions are devoid 
of any planning mechanism for effective coordination and enforcement of economic policies 
among the member countries, and these countries are not yet willing to trust in regional rather 
than national initiatives. This in turn makes diversification difficult if not impossible (Hvidt 
2013). 
It should also be mentioned here that the importance of diversification and the role of 
the private sector differ among the national visions and plans of the GCC states. For example, 
the national visions of Oman and Bahrain, owing to their small oil reserves, stress the urgency 
of accomplishing the procedure of diversification and the leading role of the private sector; 
however, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE do not express any urgency to diversify their economies 
or to develop the private sector in order to take a leading role in economic development. Qatar 
in particular deliberately points towards a slow diversification process. Saudi Arabia is 
between these two groups (Hvidt 2013). More important to point out is that those states which 
express an urgent need for diversification of their economy and advancement of the private 
sector, such as Bahrain and Oman, realize their limited degrees of success. For instance, Oman 
is the second most diversified economy in the GCC and plans in its 2020 vision to have a non-
oil sector at 81 per cent of GDP. However, at over two-thirds of the way towards completion 
of the vision for 2020, Oman’s results seem far from what was anticipated. Oil and gas remain 
the biggest contributors to the Omani economy and accounted for approximately half of GDP 
in 2012, with a real GDP that grew 5.5 per cent in 2011, primarily owing to the increase in oil 
prices (IMF 2013). Their central bank cautioned in 2012 that the country’s growth could be 
adversely affected if oil prices drop.
8
 The results of Omanizing the private sector have fallen 
far short of what was expected, as the current amount of Omanis’ labour in the private sector 
does not exceed 16 per cent of the total labour force there (GCC Secretariat General 2006–12). 
These figures support the argument by Hvidt (2013) that the current plans and visions of the 
                                                 
8
 For further information, see Arabian Gazette ( 2012). 
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GCC states are window dressing only. I would add that, without cooperation leading to 
economic integration, genuine economic development may seem like an impossible mission. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper highlights the economic position of the Gulf States over three decades after the 
establishment of the GCC, with an emphasis on three critical problems: the imbalance of the 
population structure, the dependency on oil revenues, and the failure of the private sector in 
development procedures. 
The foreign labour force currently represents nearly half of the total population and 
two-thirds of the labour force. These rates are rapidly increasing in some states in a way that is 
considered to constitute a dangerous demographic structure, most threatening in the UAE and 
Qatar, where the national population is in the minority and the national labour force comprises 
no more than 5 per cent of the total population. Furthermore, the unbalanced population 
structure and the huge expatriate labour force in the GCC states are causing the loss of a 
significant portion of the national wealth as a result of the repatriation of a considerable 
amount of wages and salaries to labour-exporting countries. In fact, the IMF has reported that 
the GCC states’ ratio of sent remittances to GDP appears to be the highest in the world, and is 
rapidly increasing. While this critical problem has been discussed and highlighted extensively 
for more than thirty years, none of the GCC states has adopted a strategy to change the skewed 
population structure. These states never employ the huge amount of oil revenue at their 
disposal to ramp up national human resources in order to reduce and replace part of the 
foreign labour force. 
Today, the GCC economy depends solely on crude oil exports. Global oil demand 
manipulates real GDP, CPI, the budget balance and the current account. Even though capital 
revenues, such as oil income, must employ capital expenditures, tracing the history shows that 
the GCC states’ budgets present a different case; capital investment expenditure depends 
directly on budget surpluses. In contrast, current expenditures such as wages and salaries can 
be illustrated as constant incremental expenditures whenever oil prices are up, but when oil 
prices drop, they are slow to decline. Such reluctance can be related to the domination of the 
public sector and the weakness of the private sector in attracting national labour. The 
persistent and heavy reliance on crude oil has created an international market that exerts a 
significant influence on the national economy, an economy in which the public sector 
dominates the private sector and has sidelined it, much to the detriment of economic growth 
and empowerment. 
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The private sector’s development in the GCC states is a new issue, which is 
highlighted when deficits appear in the government budgets of GCC countries. The 
development of the private sector will reduce dependence on oil revenue as the sole and 
exhaustible income resource as well as lessen the public sector’s domination; however, despite 
the importance of its role in overall development, there is clear evidence that the private sector 
in the GCC states is still far from experiencing real development. The significant influence of 
oil prices on GCC stock exchanges, the underdeveloped capital market, the weakness of the 
loan market, the high level of information asymmetry, the lack of capital market legislation 
and the general weakness of corporate governance provide significant evidence of the extent 
to which the private sector in the GCC states remains underdeveloped. The national plans and 
visions which have come out recently in each of the GCC states are far from achieving real 
economic development based on diversification and a strong private sector. One obstacle is 
the small size of the market in the GCC states (apart from Saudi Arabia), and the visions lack 
any planning instrument for real coordination and enforcement of economic policies among 
the GCC states. 
All of these issues present barriers to real development, and although these issues have 
been debated for many years, the governments continue to ignore them, making vague 
promises but failing to implement them. However, current political factors, such as the Iranian 
ambition to dominate the region, the US policy of the New Middle East, and the ambiguous 
outcomes of the Arab spring, serve as pressing incentives for the rulers of the GCC to abandon 
their own separate interests and adopt political and economic reforms that lead to real 
development and integration and maintain a safe future for GCC nationals and for rulers.  
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